Is Japan Asian?

A bloody internal war in 1868 pitted the Tokugawa Shogunate, supported by the French, against forces loyal to the emperor, backed by the British. At the end of this conflict, the Shogun, accused of being too weak in the face of Western "barbarians," ultimately ceded power to the young Emperor Meiji. A new modern government, entirely modeled on the Western system and centralized around His Imperial Majesty, was established.

This was the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which marked the true modernization and Westernization of Japan.

Paradoxically, the new government, despite being composed of xenophobic elements loyal to the emperor, made a complete about-face upon its formation. Instead of seeking to "expel the white barbarians" as they had always proclaimed, its founders eventually concluded that it was impossible for the newly emerging Japan to repel the Westerners by force. If Japan were to survive, it had to radically Westernize—and as quickly as possible.

Acting on this realization, the new imperial government launched a comprehensive Westernization (modernization) across the country. Under the slogan "Enrich the country, strengthen the military," the government surrounded itself with thousands of French, British, and German advisors in the industrial, military, financial, and judicial sectors. This Western-style modernization was carried out so efficiently and comprehensively that within just two decades, Japan, formerly a feudal country, had reached a modern political, industrial, and military level comparable to that of European powers. This newly acquired strength even allowed it to achieve spectacular military victories—first against the giant Chinese Empire in 1894, and then against the formidable Russian Empire in 1904.

Several factors contributed to this miraculous growth during the Meiji era: Japan's already high level of education at the time, its significant industrial potential (notably in the textile industry) even before Meiji, and its relatively stable financial situation, having experienced two and a half centuries of isolation and peace.

One example of Japan’s industrial potential during that period, and of the Japanese ability to perfectly replicate Western techniques, occurred when Admiral Perry presented the Japanese with a model locomotive during the signing of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Friendship in 1854, intending to impress this "backward" Asian nation. To his surprise, the Japanese managed, within just a year, to produce their very first fully "Made in Japan" locomotive.

Astonished by this feat, Admiral Perry wrote in his mission report that, once opened to the world, Japan might become a formidable competitor to the United States. Perry's foresight was accurate! To speak only of trains, the United States, which has since fallen far behind in railway technology, now imports subway trains for its major cities and is preparing to build a high-speed rail line in California—both of which will be manufactured in Japan.

This raises questions about how Japan, just emerging from its feudal state and faced with such rapid changes, including an internal war and the formation of a fledgling new government, managed to avoid falling into the clutches of Western colonial powers.

It seems that Japan benefited from several favorable circumstances compared to other Asian nations. First, the Americans—among the most powerful colonial predators—were too preoccupied with their Civil War to exert further pressure on this last small Asian nation. Furthermore, Japan skillfully exploited the rivalry between European powers. The French and British, distracted by their respective support of the rival factions (the emperor’s loyalists versus the Shogunate), failed to achieve a true colonization of Japan.

Moreover, Japan’s industrial and military growth was so rapid that, before Westerners could form any ill intentions toward Japan, they found in it a new partner, nearly equal in power, to assist in their colonial ventures in Asia. To illustrate this rapid growth, in just 70 years between the Meiji Restoration and World War II, Japan’s GNP had multiplied sixfold.

The two military victories Japan achieved in 1894 and 1904 demonstrated, for the first time in its long history, that this small island nation in Asia had managed to defeat both the Middle Kingdom, its historical model, and the Russian Empire, a Western power supposedly far superior to it.

It was later confirmed that these two early military victories greatly inflated Japan’s national pride to such an extent that this still-nascent power began to believe it was capable of anything, especially engaging in military ventures far beyond its true capabilities. This overconfidence eventually led Japan, 70 years later, to embark on the conquest of all of Asia, challenging most of the Western powers of the time, only to end in a catastrophic defeat for the archipelago in 1945.

The forced modernization synonymous with Westernization during the Meiji Restoration was Japan's answer to the pressing question: “What must we do to avoid the fate of China and the rest of Asia in the face of the Western onslaught?” Meiji-era Japan had convinced itself that, “if it was impossible to repel the West, our only salvation was to fully imitate it and become Western ourselves!” From this conviction emerged the modern, Westernized Japan we know today.

In parallel with this process of wholeheartedly adopting modern Western civilization, an endeavor the Japanese achieved with undeniable success, Japan also felt the need to swiftly, decisively, and completely distance itself from an Asia it deemed obsolete, decadent, and contemptible.

**Pan-Asianism to Counter the Western Threat**

The conclusion that it was better to "divorce the rest of Asia and embrace the Western cause to avoid being devoured by it" was not reached without long reflection and difficult debates during the Meiji Restoration. Even before Emperor Meiji regained power in 1868, the question of "how to avoid being colonized like China and the rest of Asia?" had already haunted Japanese minds.

Gradually, as it became clear that Japan alone could not withstand Western intrusion, different schools of thought converged on the necessity of forming an alliance of Asian nations to resist Western invasion. This marked the birth of Pan-Asianism.

The early Pan-Asianists advocated for a grand alliance among Asian countries, starting with its two neighbors, China and Korea, to collectively counter the Western threat. Such a pan-Asian alliance could, if necessary, be led by Japan.

This initial instinct to rally China against the Western menace is easy to understand, not only due to the sheer size of the Middle Kingdom but also because China had always served as a model or reference for Japan since the dawn of its history.

The idea of a Pan-Asian alliance quickly ended in failure and deep disappointment. The Pan-Asianists realized that their presumed allies, starting with their neighbors China and Korea, were too mired in their anachronistic feudalism, chronic corruption, and internal divisions to meet the expectations of the Japanese.

Despite this awareness of the desperate state of the rest of Asia, the Pan-Asianists attempted to achieve their goals by encouraging revolutions and independence movements that could "awaken" these Asian countries, enabling them to fight together against the advancing Western powers. Thus, in the early 20th century, Japan offered asylum and assistance to Asian revolutionaries, whether they were Chinese attempting to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty or Southeast Asian nationalists threatened by Western colonial authorities.

Unfortunately, the Pan-Asianists had to concede defeat a second time, with the bitter realization that, despite their efforts, the Asian countries were simply not able to meet Japan's expectations.

In the case of China, although Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolution succeeded in toppling the corrupt Qing dynasty, the fledgling democracy he envisioned could not survive the deep divisions in the country, perpetuated by rival warlords. It was futile, therefore, to rely on this version of China to fight alongside Japan against the West. Ironically, by the 1930s, the two rival factions in China—Communists and Nationalists—eventually united not to combat the Westerners but rather to fight the invading Japanese.

Faced with the inaction of the rest of Asia, the Pan-Asianists, disillusioned and increasingly contemptuous of their neighbors, gradually shifted toward a final, alternative goal: Since the Asian countries were too incompetent to rise and collaborate with Japan against the West, it would now be Japan's responsibility—modernized and powerful as it approached the 20th century—to take the initiative and unite them under the banner of resistance to Western encroachment.

The Pan-Asianists at the turn of the century did not anticipate that their new project to "unite Asian countries under Japan’s leadership" would slowly evolve into an imperialist agenda. As Japan transitioned into a militaristic totalitarian regime, it co-opted this original plan as justification for its future military invasions of Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. This militaristic and imperialist adventure ultimately ended in the tragedy of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

In reality, the military invasion of all of Asia by the Japanese Empire between 1930 and 1945 was justified by the national ambition to create a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Was this not, in a way, the realization of the alliance dreamed of by the Pan-Asianists of the Meiji era, even if they had not envisioned it being accomplished through brute force?

Exodus from Asia

It was from the deep bitterness of the Pan-Asianists toward a dying, drifting Asia that the radical thesis of the "Exodus from Asia" emerged. This idea gave rise to the famous slogan "Leave Asia, join the West," first introduced by Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1885.

Sharing the Pan-Asianists' disdain for Asia, Fukuzawa Yukichi made no secret of his intense frustration and deep contempt for the inability of the Chinese and Koreans (who were, at the time, the only Asians who mattered to him) to emerge from their corrupt, anachronistic Confucian feudalism and join Japan in the challenge of modernization, thus avoiding complete subjugation by Western imperialists.

Fukuzawa Yukichi's statements about Asia astonished even other ideologues and thinkers with their extreme virulence, which amounted to outright racism. Yet, this hateful disdain for Asia seemed to resonate so deeply with his fellow countrymen that it appears to have remained ingrained in the national mindset of Japan even into the 21st century.

While fiercely condemning the two neighboring countries, which, in his view, had chosen to remain in their "savage" state, Fukuzawa Yukichi also expressed a strong fear that "civilized" people in the West might associate Japan with these two "barbaric" nations, China and Korea, simply due to its geographical proximity to them.

To avoid such humiliation, Fukuzawa advocated for the Japanese people to "civilize" themselves—meaning, to completely Westernize—so that the country would be regarded as fully "civilized." In doing so, he urged Japan to sever all ties with these "mediocre friends" in Asia and distance itself from them as much as possible, if not physically, then at least spiritually.

"Leave Asia to Join the West!"

By the time Fukuzawa Yukichi introduced his famous slogan in 1885—"Leave Asia to join the West!"—Japan had come a long way from the 1860s, when patriotic samurai were assassinating "Western barbarians" under the rallying cry of "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians." In just two decades, not only was there no longer talk of expelling Westerners, who were now seen as "civilized," but the label of "barbarians" had been transferred to Asians, particularly the Chinese and Koreans. At the same time, the Japanese were being urged to fully immerse themselves in the civilization of these former "barbarians" in order to be accepted into the club of "civilized nations."

Since civilization at that time was synonymous with Westernization, to be admitted into the "civilized" world and escape the humiliation of being considered savages from Asia, it was necessary to dress, style one’s hair, travel, eat, and live exactly like Westerners. And Asia—the contemptible and barbaric Asia—was no longer to be spoken of!

Conclusion: Where is Japan headed?

Throughout its long history, Japan, as an island nation, has always sought an external model to shape its national organization, a model it has changed multiple times.

Initially, from the time when the "Land of Wa" first appeared in Chinese records more than 1,500 years ago, Japan began importing the first relics of civilization from the Korean Peninsula and started imitating the Middle Kingdom, inheriting its culture, writing system, and political institutions. Furthermore, the early rulers of this young nation were even granted the title "King of Wa" by the Chinese emperors.

By the 19th century, Japan abruptly changed its national model, abandoning China’s influence in favor of Europe’s in a bid to survive the threat posed by Western imperial powers. The country quickly emerged from traditional Asian feudalism to modernize and adapt to Western ways.

To implement this radical shift, Japan deemed it necessary to vigorously reject its former model—China—which, by the end of the 19th century, had become an object of deep disdain. China was now regarded by newly modernized Japan as a savage land to be shared with Western colonial powers. After all, the colonization of underdeveloped territories was part of the "civilizing" mission of the West, the new model Japan was striving to emulate.

This profound disdain for China, and for Asia more broadly, persists into the 21st century, explaining modern Japanese behavior, where there remains a deep-seated aversion to being associated with "Asian barbarians."

After World War II, defeated Japan discovered a model it found superior to Europe: the United States. Japan aligned itself entirely with its conqueror, to the point where it has been accused of becoming a mere vassal of Washington. While Europe remains respected, it has taken a back seat in Japan's priorities.

However, in the last decade, with signs of the decline of *Pax Americana* beginning to surface, Japan’s once-solid trust in America has started to waver. An increasingly divided and weakened America, both internally and externally, has lost its standing as a model of democracy and freedom. Repeated isolationist tendencies, particularly under the unpredictable leadership of Donald Trump, have led to growing doubts among the Japanese about America’s reliability as a security guarantor for its allies, including Japan.

It would not be surprising if some begin to wonder whether it is time to consider a new model other than the American one. The rising uncertainty surrounding America’s commitment to protecting Japan has fueled a nationalist movement advocating for the country’s rearmament and urging the public not to rely solely on the United States.

If Japan can no longer count on America, particularly in the crucial area of defense, a return to Europe—as in the time of Fukuzawa Yukichi—might seem like a possibility. But do the European powers that Japan once strove to emulate in the 19th century still represent an ideal model for Japan in the 21st century?

In recent years, in a tentative effort to strengthen ties with Western Europe, particularly in the defense sector, Japan has conducted joint military exercises with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This is a significant shift, as Japan had only ever partnered with the Americans in defense matters since World War II. At the same time, Tokyo has taken cautious steps toward closer relations with NATO.

Yet, one must wonder whether this "Old Continent," which wields far less power today than it did in the 19th century and still retains the same smugness (if not arrogance), is truly capable of welcoming an Asian country into its fold with more than mere courtesy—without taking it seriously. Japan’s failure to even partially integrate into NATO, in the form of establishing a representative office, underscores the limits faced by a country "considered Asian" when trying to join this exclusive club of wealthy Western nations.

If not America or Europe, Japan might consider the possibility of returning to Asia—now experiencing significant growth—in its search for a new model. Perhaps India, among other countries, could be an option.

The question remains, however, whether Asia is ready to forgive and welcome Japan back into its fold, after all that Japan inflicted upon it over the past century.

Asians are not blind to the deep contempt that originated in the 19th century and still lingers in the Japanese mindset toward Asia today. Japan’s military conquests throughout Asia, accompanied by atrocities grounded in this traditional disdain, are a painful reminder. After World War II, Japan’s neglect of forging sincere and lasting relationships with Asia—beyond mere economic interests—further exemplified this arrogance.

The lack of sincerity in Japan’s approach, especially toward Southeast Asia, has been evident on numerous occasions, such as Tokyo’s refusal to join international sanctions against military or civilian dictatorships in the region. Japan's economic interests in these countries have often outweighed its proclaimed commitment to democratic values. A recent example of this ambiguous stance is Japan’s continued normal relations with Myanmar’s military regime, even after the coup that ended democracy in that country.

Today, as Japan turns back toward Asia, it has realized the gravity of its isolated position within a region to which it fundamentally belongs. This isolation is self-imposed, the result of decades of arrogance towards its neighbors.

East Asia, in this context, is divided into two parts: Northeast Asia—comprising China, the two Koreas, and Japan—and Southeast Asia, which includes the ten nations currently grouped under ASEAN.

In Northeast Asia, Japan is embroiled in territorial disputes with all four of its immediate neighbors: Russia, China, Taiwan, and South Korea. Largely adhering to the anti-communist line dictated by Washington, Tokyo consistently displays hostility towards China and North Korea, even though its own economic interests would benefit from improved relations with Beijing. At the same time, Japan remains embroiled in a constant feud with South Korea, which harbors lingering resentment towards its former colonizer (1905-1945). China and both Koreas still refuse to forgive Japan for its perceived arrogance and persistent denial of the war crimes committed in these countries during the last century.

While relations in Northeast Asia are far from friendly, Southeast Asia presents a somewhat more welcoming environment for Japan. However, Japan still finds itself viewed there as a "fair-weather friend." Its respect in the region is largely tied to its economic power, represented by its Yen, which is increasingly rivaled by Chinese Yuan.

Moreover, the Asia that Japan once scorned as "savage" and chose to ignore for over a century is now experiencing significant economic growth. The countries in this region are increasingly drawn to a resurgent China, whose rising economic power exerts an almost magnetic pull, even though its growing military strength is a cause for concern.

In a historical reversal of roles, China—once rejected with disdain by modern Japan in the 19th century—has now become the leader of the resistance against Western hegemony in Asia. Japan, the emerging power of the 19th century that aspired to unite Asia to counter Western dominance, now finds itself in economic decline and isolated within Asia.

Whenever Japan has sought to play a political role in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, beyond its economic influence, it has often been met with cynicism. Japan is generally seen as no more than a loyal messenger of Uncle Sam.

Thus, Japan finds itself today at a crossroads, uncertain and in search of a new model or direction. Having vehemently and disdainfully abandoned a dying Asia to embrace Europe, which ultimately did not fully accept or include it, Japan later aligned with the United States, only to be regarded by the Americans as a mere vassal or, at best, a protectorate. Even if Japan manages to swallow its pride and disdain to consider rejoining the new Asia, will it find friends ready to welcome it with open arms?

For the first time in its history, Japan must now chart its course independently, without relying on an external model to guide it.

Rather than futilely seeking a new external model, Japan should remember that it possesses within itself a powerful asset that has already earned it global respect. This asset, deeply embedded in its post-war Constitution, is its remarkable pacifism.

Even as it is increasingly attacked by nationalists who see it as an obstacle to their efforts to rearm the country, Japan would do well to promote this unique pacifism on the international stage. It could carve out a place of honor not only in Asia but also in the world.

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**Chen Yo-Jung** is a French national fluent in six languages (French, English, Mandarin, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese), born in 1947 in Taiwan. He grew up in Vietnam and Hong Kong and pursued higher education in Japan. He served for 23 years at the French Embassy in Tokyo as a press attaché and translator-interpreter. Naturalized as a French citizen in 1981, Chen became a permanent official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994. He served as Deputy Consul/Press Advisor in various diplomatic and consular posts, including Tokyo, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Singapore, and Beijing, before retiring in Japan in 2012.